Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Science of Knowing (Wissenschaftslehre) [1st ed]', 'Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology' and 'On the Source of Necessity'

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42 ideas

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 2. Phenomenology
22216 Phenomenology studies different types of correlation between consciousness and its objects [Husserl, by Bernet]
22217 Phenomenology aims to validate objects, on the basis of intentional intuitive experience [Husserl, by Bernet]
21217 Phenomenology needs absolute reflection, without presuppositions [Husserl]
22218 There can only be a science of fluctuating consciousness if it focuses on stable essences [Husserl, by Bernet]
22219 Husserl saw transcendental phenomenology as idealist, in its construction of objects [Husserl, by Bernet]
22204 Start philosophising with no preconceptions, from the intuitively non-theoretical self-given [Husserl]
22207 Epoché or 'bracketing' is refraining from judgement, even when some truths are certain [Husserl]
22208 'Bracketing' means no judgements at all about spatio-temporal existence [Husserl]
22210 After everything is bracketed, consciousness still has a unique being of its own [Husserl]
22215 Phenomenology describes consciousness, in the light of pure experiences [Husserl]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
22024 Fichte's subjectivity struggles to then give any account of objectivity [Pinkard on Fichte]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
22201 The use of mathematical-style definitions in philosophy is fruitless and harmful [Husserl]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / g. System S4
15102 S4 says there must be some necessary truths (the actual ones, of which there is at least one) [Cameron]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
22017 Normativity needs the possibility of negation, in affirmation and denial [Fichte, by Pinkard]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
22209 Our goal is to reveal a new hidden region of Being [Husserl]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / h. Dasein (being human)
22211 As a thing and its perception are separated, two modes of Being emerge [Husserl]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
22202 The World is all experiencable objects [Husserl]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
22213 Absolute reality is an absurdity [Husserl]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
21218 The sense of anything contingent has a purely apprehensible essence or Eidos [Husserl]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
19263 Imagine an object's properties varying; the ones that won't vary are the essential ones [Husserl, by Vaidya]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
15103 Blackburn fails to show that the necessary cannot be grounded in the contingent [Cameron]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
22018 Necessary truths derive from basic assertion and negation [Fichte, by Pinkard]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
21220 The physical given, unlike the mental given, could be non-existing [Husserl]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
22064 Fichte's logic is much too narrow, and doesn't deduce ethics, art, society or life [Schlegel,F on Fichte]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
22032 Fichte's key claim was that the subjective-objective distinction must itself be subjective [Fichte, by Pinkard]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
22205 Feelings of self-evidence (and necessity) are just the inventions of theory [Husserl]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
21221 Direct 'seeing' by consciousness is the ultimate rational legitimation [Husserl]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
22220 The phenomena of memory are given in the present, but as being past [Husserl, by Bernet]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
22206 Natural science has become great by just ignoring ancient scepticism [Husserl]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / a. Other minds
22020 We only see ourselves as self-conscious and rational in relation to other rationalities [Fichte]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
22221 We know another's mind via bodily expression, while also knowing it is inaccessible [Husserl, by Bernet]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
22212 Pure consciousness is a sealed off system of actual Being [Husserl]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
22060 The Self is the spontaneity, self-relatedness and unity needed for knowledge [Fichte, by Siep]
22066 Novalis sought a much wider concept of the ego than Fichte's proposal [Novalis on Fichte]
22016 The self is not a 'thing', but what emerges from an assertion of normativity [Fichte, by Pinkard]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
22019 Consciousness of an object always entails awareness of the self [Fichte]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
22214 We never meet the Ego, as part of experience, or as left over from experience [Husserl]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
22061 Judgement is distinguishing concepts, and seeing their relations [Fichte, by Siep]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
22203 Only facts follow from facts [Husserl]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
22023 Fichte's idea of spontaneity implied that nothing counts unless we give it status [Fichte, by Pinkard]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
22065 Fichte reduces nature to a lifeless immobility [Schlegel,F on Fichte]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / f. Eternalism
15104 The 'moving spotlight' theory makes one time privileged, while all times are on a par ontologically [Cameron]